



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK *of* NEW YORK

## Global Creditor Mix and USD Liquidity Swap Lines

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The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or Federal Reserve System

L. Goldberg GRF Nov.2018

# Understanding the status of the dollar financial safety net

## Main points

- International roles of USD dominate, strong on financial transactions.
- Structure of financial intermediation has evolved (more market based).
- Dollar imbalances have evolved (regulatory and management of banks).
- Constraints and reaction functions of banks vs nonbanks likely differ.
- Dollar financial safety net through central bank currency swaps
  - ✓ Extreme / systemic stress in private dollar funding markets
  - ✓ Needs for cross-currency liquidity change
  - ✓ Through central banks, via banks
- What approach to safety net under market-based institutions?
  - ✓ Lower cross-currency liquidity exposures and leverage. Outside of the central bank direct financial safety net. Is this unfinished business?


# International role of USD continues to be strong in global liquidity

The share of debt securities and the US dollar in international credit has risen


International credit to the non-bank sector, amounts outstanding

Graph 1

International credit to non-banks by instrument



International credit to non-residents by instruments and currency



Further information on the BIS global liquidity indicators is available at [www.bis.org/statistics/about\\_gli\\_stats.htm](http://www.bis.org/statistics/about_gli_stats.htm).

<sup>1</sup> Cross-border loans and local loans in foreign currency to non-bank borrowers. <sup>2</sup> By residence and immediate sector of issuer; all instruments; all maturities; non-bank issuers. International debt securities are debt securities issued by non-banks in a market other than the local market of the country where the borrower resides.

Sources: Dealogic; Euroclear; Thomson Reuters; Xtrakter Ltd; BIS locational banking statistics and global liquidity indicators; BIS calculations; authors' calculations.


# Banks now fall below nonbanks as creditors for AE borrowers (not so for EMs).

The shift to debt securities has been stronger for advanced economy borrowers


Amounts outstanding, as a percentage of regional GDP

Graph 2

Advanced economy borrowers



Emerging market economy borrowers




<sup>1</sup> Cross-border loans and local loans in foreign currency to non-bank borrowers. <sup>2</sup> By residence and immediate sector of issuer; all instruments; all maturities; non-bank issuers. <sup>3</sup> Cross-border debt securities holdings in all currencies and local holdings in foreign currency reported by LBS-reporting banks.

Sources: Dealogic; Euroclear; Thomson Reuters; Xtrakter Ltd; BIS locational banking statistics (LBS); BIS calculations; authors' calculations.

# Bank-based flows have been most volatile in response to risk events, especially for bank borrowers

XB Global Liquidity, all countries, borrower perspective  
4-quarter moving averages of quarterly growth rates, %



$$\text{Quarterly Growth Rate}_t = \left( \text{Outstanding Stock}_t / \text{Outstanding Stock}_{t-1} \right) - 1$$

XBL = Cross-border loans, IDS = International Debt Securities

Data Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics, International Debt Securities

## Risk effects / constraints likely differ across bank v. nonbank creditors.


Types of participants in global flows evolve, so too elasticities/ constraints.

Still not well modelled in economic research.

- Devereux and Yetman (2010 JMCB): leverage constrained representative investors invest in equities and bonds. Sign of portfolio changes to shocks depends on assumed market segmentation
- Shin (2011 IMF Mundell lecture): risk-neutral but value at risk constrained banks expand or contract leverage, contingent on risk level, so that constraint always binds. Non-banks as mean-variance risk averse investors. Aggregate position depends on mix.
- Gabaix and Mattioli (2018 QJE): as financiers have limited risk taking capacity and have risks on balance sheets, shocks influence pattern of capital flows and exchange rates in equilibrium
- Gertler-Karadi / Gertler-Kiyotaki. Net worth collateral constraints

# Central bank dollar swap lines

Usage of USD swap lines remains low: conditions in the FX swap market have continued to improve and market access has not been an issue.



\*A negative number reflects a premium for \$ funding.

Source: Bloomberg

## Central bank dollar swap lines

Usage of USD swap lines remains low: as conditions in the FX swap market have continued to improve and market access has not been an issue.

Banks: better preparation, more efficient balance sheet management, lower FX mismatch and enhanced hedging

According to the BIS Triannual Survey

Size: Daily activity of FX swaps, forwards and cross-currency swaps **increased by almost 50% to \$3.1 trillion from 2007 to 2016**; For comparison FX spot activity \$1.7 tril (2016)

Users and their objectives

Trades between the **largest international banks account for roughly 51%**; Demand is for funding and/or for hedging

Trades between reporting banks and **other financial institutions is around 43%**; Demand is mainly for hedging, at times regulatory hedging

Trades with **non-financial customers account for 6%**; Demand is mainly to exploit differences in funding costs in different currencies

# Factors Driving Medium-Term Developments (since 2014)

- Since mid-2014, entities have been paying a premium for U.S. dollars despite minimal evidence of issues with market access.
- Wedges between demand and supply:
  - ***Demand*** for \$ funding & hedging has been large, particularly by non-banks
    - ✓ Monetary policy divergence encourages investors to diversify internationally (particularly Japanese firms)
    - ✓ Cheaper issuance offers opportunities for U.S. corporates to issue in foreign currencies (e.g. euros)
  - Key sources of ***supply*** constraints impacting pricing are:
    - ✓ Bank balance sheet constraints post Basel III, limiting the capacity to expand the size of off-balance sheet items (including FX derivatives); Liquidity requirements
      - Reporting days key; particularly year end given specific year-end requirements (G-SIBs scores, bank levy taxes, resolution fees, etc.)
    - ✓ Self-imposed - more conservative pricing of counterparty and market risks and higher transaction costs around risk events
    - ✓ Limited investment options for the received foreign currency
    - ✓ Non-banks' constraints – limiting the capacity/interest of non-regulated investors to supply dollars in the FX swap market

## Open issues

- USD foreign currency liquidity swap lines between Fed with ECB-BoE-SNB-BoJ-BoC meet systemic event dollar needs of banks
  - ✓ Standing arrangement since October 2013
- Evolving constraints on nonbanks and net funding exposure information is less well understood.
- What are the risks through nonbanks, and are market-based mechanisms (including accessing dollar liquidity through covered banks) sufficient to avoid costly externalities?

Thank you.

# Different institutions are involved in types of flows

## XBL and IDS, typical lenders and borrowers

	<b>Typical Lenders</b>	<b>Typical Borrowers</b>	<b>Notes</b>
<b>XB loans to banks</b>	Internationally-active banks	Banks (all sizes)	<i>Interbank market (unsecured and repo)</i>
<b>XB loans to nonbanks</b>	Internationally-active banks	Large non-financial corporates; exporting/importing firms; Leveraged non-bank financials	<i>Syndicated loan market; trade credit; project financing</i>
<b>IDS issued by banks</b>	Pension funds; Insurance companies; MMMFs; Hedge funds	Large and mid-sized banks	<i>Smaller investor base than for IDS issued by non-banks</i>
<b>IDS issued by non-banks</b>	Pension funds; Insurance companies; MMMFs; Hedge funds	Non-financial corporates; governments; Insurance companies	<i>Broader investor base than for IDS issued by banks</i>